Average Unfairness in Routing Games

Explainable & Ethical AI
Published: arXiv: 2601.16187v1
Authors

Pan-Yang Su Arwa Alanqary Bryce L. Ferguson Manxi Wu Alexandre M. Bayen Shankar Sastry

Abstract

We propose average unfairness as a new measure of fairness in routing games, defined as the ratio between the average latency and the minimum latency experienced by users. This measure is a natural complement to two existing unfairness notions: loaded unfairness, which compares maximum and minimum latencies of routes with positive flow, and user equilibrium (UE) unfairness, which compares maximum latency with the latency of a Nash equilibrium. We show that the worst-case values of all three unfairness measures coincide and are characterized by a steepness parameter intrinsic to the latency function class. We show that average unfairness is always no greater than loaded unfairness, and the two measures are equal only when the flow is fully fair. Besides that, we offer a complete comparison of the three unfairness measures, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the first theoretical analysis in this direction. Finally, we study the constrained system optimum (CSO) problem, where one seeks to minimize total latency subject to an upper bound on unfairness. We prove that, for the same tolerance level, the optimal flow under an average unfairness constraint achieves lower total latency than any flow satisfying a loaded unfairness constraint. We show that such improvement is always strict in parallel-link networks and establish sufficient conditions for general networks. We further illustrate the latter with numerical examples. Our results provide theoretical guarantees and valuable insights for evaluating fairness-efficiency tradeoffs in network routing.

Paper Summary

Problem
The main problem addressed in this research paper is the tension between efficiency and fairness in routing games. In routing games, user behavior can lead to equilibria that are significantly inefficient compared to centrally optimized solutions. However, these optimal flows can compromise fairness, potentially discriminating against certain users by assigning them disproportionately high latency routes. The researchers aim to formalize measures of unfairness, understand its trade-offs with efficiency, and develop algorithms for computing flows that minimize the total latency under unfairness constraints.
Key Innovation
The key innovation of this work is the introduction of a new measure of unfairness called "average unfairness". This measure captures the average envy experienced by users in a given flow, shifting the focus from the worst-off user to the expected delay in the network. The researchers show that average unfairness is a natural complement to two existing unfairness notions: loaded unfairness and user equilibrium unfairness. They also establish a complete comparison of the three unfairness measures, which is the first theoretical analysis in this direction.
Practical Impact
The practical impact of this research is significant. The researchers show that average unfairness can lead to more efficient solutions than other fairness constraints, particularly in the constrained system optimum (CSO) problem. This has implications for network routing and resource allocation, where fairness-efficiency trade-offs arise. The introduction of average unfairness provides a more stable way to reason about fairness in routing games, capturing the average user experience rather than just the worst-off user.
Analogy / Intuitive Explanation
Imagine a highway with multiple lanes, where users are trying to reach their destinations as quickly as possible. In a fair system, all users would experience similar delays, but in an unfair system, some users might be stuck in traffic while others zoom by. Average unfairness measures the average delay experienced by all users, rather than just the worst-off user. This approach provides a more nuanced understanding of fairness in routing games, aligning with some fairness notions studied in the broader resource allocation literature.
Paper Information
Categories:
cs.MA cs.GT eess.SY
Published Date:

arXiv ID:

2601.16187v1

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